Trumping Everyone on Iran
This is not a gas, or a blast, but I'm going to drone on about it at mine own pace
The general destruction of the mullahcracy of Iran is proceeding well militarily1, with almost every major prewar leader dead and/or seen only on cardboard. The US has said they have moved on to destroying the factories that make the missiles and drones having pretty much defanged the current inventory of missiles.
There’s probably a degree of over confidence in those statements in that Iran is still firing a few missiles but generally speaking it seems to be correct - the numbers have dropped enormously. While that doesn’t mean the mullahs are all dead and/or impotent, the thousands of missiles they had before February 28th have declined by at least an order of magnitude, with many of the survivors trapped in underground bunkers that the US/Israel have drones monitoring for traffic in and out.
In fact, the US and Israel have got full control of Iranian airspace and can hit anything they want with pretty much any weapon they want, as has been noted by the way they have drones taking out individual Basij checkpoints or buildings. Sure some US/Israeli drones get shot down, but that’s why you fly unmanned drones not manned planes for such missions. The largest problem seems to be that Iran is so big there are parts (e.g. the NE corner around Mashhad) which have few hits because of range limitations by the shorter ranged US/Israeli aircraft/drones.
What that means is that, in general, the missile threat from Iran is over. At least in regards to defended locations like airports, military bases and the like. Which in turn means all this hyped up worry about the gulf states or Israel being about to run out of expensive Patriot/THAAD etc. missiles was either deliberate disinformation by Iran/allies or idiots spouting off (or both).
However missiles are not the only way the regime can attack. There are also drones. The Iranian drones sold to/built under license by Russia have been an immense problem for Ukraine and those same drones are problem for Iran’s neighbors too (see chart above) because the number of attacks using those have taken longer to decrease.
That’s only part of the problem. Many of the successful hits on buildings and bases seem to have been from drone attacks because, for reasons, drones are hard to defend against if you haven’t planned on defending against them. Fabian Hoffman explains in some detail why
Now, obviously, there are defences against Iranian drones and once you deploy the right detectors they are fairly easy to spot and then remove. And in fact it seems like one way or another the strikes are generally being handled, but there are still a few leakers every day. However it seems to me that a lot of the footage of drone attacks seem to be of drones being hit by close in fire near their end targets rather than drones actually making a hit. Because the take out is so close it can be unclear whether they struck the intended target or not.
But as is quite clear from Ukraine, drone attacks against fixed infrastructure are eminently defendable once you have all the right bits. It sounds like Ukraine is willingly accepting large amounts of Persian Gulf state cash in exchange for hardware and trainers. So drones against desalination plants, oil refineries etc. are probably not going to succeed often enough that they cause long term problems. In fact there is one very obvious difference between Iran’s drone warfare and Russia’s (or Ukraine’s), which is that Iran cannot put together a swarm of drones that can overwhelm defences for a specific target. Instead they send, AFAICT, either singletons or just a handful at a time to a particular target and that, in turn, makes them easy to shoot down. So the drone threat is also over-hyped, in general.
The Dire Strait
However drone, missile and other attacks against shipping are a whole other story. In fact the Strait of Hormuz has been effectively closed to shipping for the whole of March. Perun has a good hour long video on the topic
The key here is that there’s an asymmetric knowledge/risk problem here where it is easier to close the thing than to open it. Ship owners and crews are well aware that their ships are large, relatively slow moving targets passing within visual distance of Iran and thus risk an attack by a missile, drone, boat… that they can’t dodge or defend against.
It is true that there are ships passing through, but relatively few compared to the numbers normally observed. In order for shipping to resume at scale, the owners and crews need to be sure that the chances of a ship being hit is down in the 0.00something% range.
[Brief probability digression. Transits of the Strait of Hormuz are normally in the 100 vessel a day range. That means that if there is a 1% chance of a vessel being hit, then on average one vessel will be hit a day. 0.01% puts it at one vessel being hit every three months. Owner, insurers, and crews can probably handle a sub 0.01% chance but that is about the upper limit]
That is a problem, because significant fractions of the global supply of oil, LNG and fertilizer pass through the Strait. People like Phillips P O’Brien think that this means that Iran is in one way winning its war while losing its war with the US.
It’s not a bad summery of where we are and makes some good points. However, and this is very important, it misses one key factor.
That factor is that closure of the Strait of Hormuz is not, directly, a problem for either Israel or the USA. The US (with the exception of the idiots in California) has no need to import oil, gas or fertilizer and Israel’s imports of all three are sufficiently small that the US can trivially supply them in the event that no other supplier is available.
It is a major problem for several other nations though. First, many of the gulf nations depend on it not just for exports of oil etc. but for imports of things like… food, as well as clothing, Chinesium consumer electronics and the like. Second many European and Asian nations really need that oil, gas and fertilizer.
Some nations (e.g. Japan) have significant stockpiles and so probably can cope with several months of shortage, but even Japan will eventually run out. Many other nations (e.g. Pakistan, Bangladesh, India and probably West Taiwan) have considerably less stockpiled and so feel rather more urgency. Europe should do too for that matter.
Numerous talking heads have ridiculed the US effort claiming that the US made no plans to stop the closure of the Strait and suggesting that President Trump, Defense Secretary Hegseth and so on were taken by surprise that the Iranians would close the Strait. Those talking heads are almost certainly wrong. What they miss is that under Trump 2.0 the US is not interested in acting as the free world’s volunteer coast guard any more. Once you realize that, you see that Iran is fighting to provide President Trump with a lever he can wield against the rest of the world. The mullahs, BTW, have no choice here. They either surrender to Trump, accept regime crippling to the level of regime change, or they try to close the strait and make the rest of the world force the US/Israel to back down. Their problem is, I think, that Trump has planned to take advantage of precisely this disruption and he won’t be backing down.
Consider. All the way back in Trump 1.0, the President made it clear he was unhappy with the way he saw other countries free loading off the back of the US. He and his 2.0 cabinet - e.g. JD Vance and Marco Rubio - have made many speeches stating quite clearly that under Trump (and presumably successor MAGA-style presidents) the US will only respect allies that actually meaningfully contribute. The Strait of Hormuz closure is, as Hans Mahncke points out, where the US tells its freeloading allies and non-allies that the freeloading stops
The Strait of Hormuz issue is the perfect “allies” test. The United States has very little direct interest in the strait, as almost none of its ships or energy flows pass through there. So before the United States starts doing all the heavy lifting, it is the ideal moment to ask those who actually benefit from the strait being open what they are willing to contribute.
The fact that they all said nothing is proof of what Trump has been saying all along, that supposed “allies” are really just freeloaders. So this was never about whether the Europeans could actually help with a handful of dilapidated frigates. It was a test, and they all failed.
What Hans doesn’t mention, that Perun covers in his video, is that the gulf states have quite a lot of naval vessels that would be suitable for escort duty if they are actually as capable as they are supposed to be. Forcing the gulf states to be a bit more aggressive is, probably, one of the goals of this exercise. Either the gulf states step up and use their expensive naval toys or they quietly admit that they blew shipyards of money on kit that they can’t operate properly in actual combat situations. My bet is that they’ll do option 2, though I could be wrong.
They can then reflect on how that differs from, to pick a neighboring country completely not at random, Israel which can not just operate advanced technical weapons but develop them too. I’m not entirely sure how this works, but I suspect the Abraham Accords are going to get more signatories and some kind of mutual defence treaty that allows Israel to protect gulf state shipping and infrastructure, by, for example, having its aircraft and drones bang next door to the US ones in the various states. Certain temporary residents of certain gulf states (coff Hamass coff Qatar coff) may have some fatal accidents as that comes to pass.
Then there’s the oil, gas etc. importing countries.
Europe, Who Cares?
In Europe, France may get a partial credit by at least having a naval presence in more or less the right place, though statements like this suggest not. It is possible that Italy and Greece and a couple of other countries will too, but Germany and the Yookay, to pick two obvious examples, have just shown to the entire world that they have no real navy.
However in the grand scheme of things, despite their self belief, Europe is a side show. European nations are in most respects no more important or relevant than, say South American ones and over the last quarter century they have intentionally embraced idiotic deindustrialization policies that mean they are unable to respond to entirely predictable world events. That’s not so true of Poland or Eastern Europe in general but the fact that four years in to the Russia Ukraine war, European nations have failed to seriously rearm or supply armaments to Ukraine. And then there is the whole anti-Semitism thing and the way that they have allowed themselves to be colonized by Islam. What the current Iran War shows is that Europe is unable project force in a meaningful manner and also, apparently, unable to do anything other than whine when events occur. As wretchard Xeets:
In retrospect the Global World was excessively dependent on chokepoints controlled by terror groups and theocracies for decades. These narrow points, like mountain passes, could be crossed only by their leave. They were passable only at their pleasure.
Rather than mitigate supply chain risk, the Global World for ideological and economic reasons, increased their dependence without corresponding insurance, either in the form of stockpiles, alternative suppliers or military forces. They relied instead on the charlatans who offered "international law" as a substitute for physical security.
Time and again they made themselves even more dependent on bad actors: on artisanal mining of rare earths in Africa, on Russian pipelines, on undefended Taiwanese chip foundries. Until, in a moment of reckoning Iran partly closed the Bab el-Mandam and more consequentially menaced the Strait of Hormuz and there was no answer. The Global World discovered it had not the fleet to secure either passage or as in the case of the Royal Navy, found it had not a fleet at all.
Suddenly Europe rued closing down its nuclear plants. Australia regretted closing down its fuel refineries. Perhaps before long the Global World will worried about the security of Taiwan. It is easier to be wise after the fact
There’s more to the Xeet than that, and it is all good, as is the Xeet it refers to about the empty suit that is 2 Tier.
Asia and Oceania
Of course, as the that Xeet above notes, it hasn’t just been Europe that has blindly allowed itself to be put in a position of weakness regarding entirely predictable world events.
[On weakness front, the mullahs seem to have thought they could threaten, bully etc. the US as they had done for the last almost half century. It turns out that President Trump’s reaction to being threatened like that is “kill them”, unlike previous presidents. ]
Starting west and working east, Iran’s neighbor Pakistan’s government is showing signs of willingness to stand up to Iran and escort ships, but very much for its own shipping. That’s perhaps because it’s busy laying smack on Afghanistan but it may also be because it dreads being seen cooperating with its other neighbor, India and because it is trying to play both sides.
India seems to be taking it seriously. It has both done some diplomacy with Iran to get promises of safe passage and is sending naval assets to provide escorts. Plus India seems to have had a word with President Trump and got permission to take a bunch of shadow fleet oil.
Sri Lanka and Bangladesh are unable to project any force and are entirely dependent on gulf oil and fertilizer. The words “completely fucked” come to mind. In the case of Sri Lanka there’s the additional issue that they got in bed with the Chicoms, which may not have been a good choice.
Indochina is in similar state for the most part, though Malaysia and Indonesia are less dependent on the gulf and can probably export enough to obtain what they lack. They may also be able to support some of their neighbors. But a prolonged shortage is going to hurt all the countries in the region that don’t have oil/gas assets as they don’t have much in the way of suitable naval assets.
Taking a jump south there’s Australia. Which is being very European with touches of California and is now wondering whether closing all those refineries was quite so smart after all2.
Jumping back north of the equator we have Taiwan, Japan, the Koreas and the Chicoms. Taiwan is, for obvious reasons, not projecting any force a third of the way around the globe, but does, also for obvious reasons, have significant oil stockpiles. I assume the amount is similar to Japan’s 7-8 months consumption but I’m not sure. Korea probably has less, but still some. And as I discussed in a previous post, the Chicoms almost certainly do not have as much oil as they want.
The Great Miscalculation
I don’t have any particular insights or knowledge about the Iran war, but I do have some longer term thoughts.
Both South Korea and Japan could escort ships and, AIUI, have a few assets in the region that were used to escort ships threatened by the Houthis. Both countries have additional vessels that could be used but are not in the region, however both are currently unwilling to do so. I don’t have any insight into Korean politics, but my read on PM Takaichi is that under certain conditions she would be willing to deploy JMSDF ships in an escort role. One of the conditions though is that she be as sure as can be that the Chicoms aren’t going to do something stupid regarding Taiwan, another would be a UN Security Council resolution. She does however face significant domestic resistance to getting involved even if those base conditions are met3 where the dominant media narrative seems to be that President Trump just decided to attack Iran for no valid reason or because of the Jooz, and I’ve seen no coverage (I may have missed some, but it certainly hasn’t been major) of the US and Israeli claims that Iran was threatening to make nukes again.
Which leads us to China. China imported a lot of oil and gas through the Strait, some from Iran but plenty from other places too. China also has a large navy and thus should be able to provide escorts but that puts them in a very delicate position because they have been a major supplier of weapons to Iran, as well as consumer of most of Iran’s oil output. So if the PLAN show up to escort ships they are basically escorting them against the threat they helped create which is very embarrassing, on the other hand if they don’t they look pathetically weak and dependent on the US for oil and gas - especially given that their other play, Venezuela, just got taken out at the start of the year.
If you think placing Winnie the Flu in this dilemma was an accident then I have some swampland near Mar A Lago to sell you. It turns out President Trump can not just walk and chew gum, he can also talk and do two or three other things at the same time. In this case he’s making China look weak and unreliable as a partner because either it supports its erstwhile ally, Iran, and doesn’t help break the blockade or it dumps that ally and helps itself and its other allies/dependents like Sri Lanka. In neither case are the Chicoms getting what they want and they are seen to be dancing to the tune of the MAGA USA.
It’s a lose lose situation for Winnie the Flu and a teachable moment for the rest of the world. So all in all I think, as indeed he recently posted on Truth Social, that President Trump may be quite happy to let other people flail around and fail to solve the safe shipping problem for a while
Toll Booth Time?
And it may come to pass that in a few weeks when the MEF shows up, if there are still no patrols and escorts that President Trump takes some advice from the Instapundit4
What are the odds that Trump puts a tariff-like “security fee” on all oil transiting the Strait of Hormuz? . . .
People have speculated that the Marines are intended to seize Kharg Island and thus grab the Iranian regime by the financial short and curlies, but I wonder if there isn’t a better choice of island. Specifically Qeshm Island5 in the Strait of Hormuz. Taking that island, which has at least one port and an airport, would put the US in the position to control access to something like half the world’s oil and gas supplies.
Of course the US would have to hold it, and it’s in swimming distance of Bandar Abbas where the Iranian navy used to be, but given the general degradation of the IRGC I expect that in a couple of weeks there won’t be much that can shoot at it and meanwhile it can act as a base to stop attacks on ships passing through the Strait - for a price…
BattleSwarmBlog has near daily updates as do miscellaneous Xitter accounts like Osint613
More here -
Qeshm also has, allegedly, underground missile and fast boat/drone stores. Taking it would remove the surviving amounts of those from Iranian control.












PS John Konrad seems to be thinking in similar ways to me - https://gcaptain.com/the-hormuz-hypothesis-what-if-the-u-s-navy-isnt-in-a-hurry-to-reopen-the-strait/
You really should send your work to various “news” networks. Your analysis is better by far than that found on any widely circulated “news” broadcast, podcast, paper or website.